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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GEORGE K. BRADFORD, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
ANDREA 0. BRADFORD and : 
JAMES A. DEMIT A : 
Defendants/Appellants. 
: Case No. 981745-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2) (1) 
(1996) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. When deciding to partition property in a divorce action, 
did the trial Court misapply the law when it found that 
appellee husband was the creditor of appellant wife? 
The standard of review for the trial court's 
interpretation of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is 
correction of error. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1192 
(Utah App. 1991) . However, the standard of review for the 
trial court's finding of fact in this area is whether the 
trial court committed a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
1988) . 
II. After entering a decree of divorce, did the trial court 
abuse its broad powers of discretion when it apportioned the 
marital property between the two parties? 
The standard of review on this issue is the above-
mentioned Rasband standard. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Please see the attached addendum "A" - The Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §25-6-5 (1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee ("'Mr. Bradford") tried this action in the 
Fourth District Court, Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding, 
on a complaint for divorce and a claim that appellant ("Mrs. 
Bradford") had fraudulently conveyed her portion of the 
marital home. Findings of Fact and a Decree of Divorce were 
filed on July 14, 1998. Appellant's Timely Motion to Alter 
and Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree 
were denied on September 4, 1998. Appellant then filed a 
timely appeal to which appellee now responds. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married in June 1985, in 
Provo, Utah (Findings of Fact No. 1, p.152, Record) (3/4/98 
Tr. At 37) . 
2. During the three months before the commencement of 
their divorce proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were legal 
residents of Utah Country, Utah (Findings of Fact No. 2, p. 
152, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 47). 
3. Effective July 14, 1998, the lower court found that 
the existence of irreconcilable differences between Mr. and 
Mrs. Bradford made the continuation of their marriage no 
longer possible (Findings of Fact No. 3, p. 152, Record). 
4. Prior to their marriage, Mr, and Mrs. Bradford had 
each been married once. Although no children were born of 
their marriage, each party has at least one adult child from 
their previous marriages (Findings of Fact Nos. 4 & 5, p. 
152, Record). 
5. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford are 63 and 65 years old, 
respectively (Findings of Fact, No. 6, p. 151, Record) 
(3/4/98 Tr. at 89) . 
6. While they were married, Mrs. Bradford possessed few 
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assets other than some personal property and land in 
Indianola, Utah. After paying the debt on this land with 
money given to her by her husband, Mrs. Bradford eventually 
sold this land. She kept all of the profits herself 
(Findings of Fact No. 7, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 3-4). 
7a. Before they were married, Mr. Bradford worked at 
Geneva Steel where he received special on-the-job training. 
He was also, and still is, a janitor with the Nebo School 
District (Findings of Fact No. 8, page 151, Record) (3/4/98 
Tr. at 37, 39). 
7b. When the divorce was granted, Mr. Bradford's monthly 
assets were thus: $410 from the Nebo School District, $769 
from Social Security, $324 from his pension, and $50 from 
rent from his property. Said figures total $1,553. 
However, because Mr. Bradford puts $105 per month into a 
discretionary retirement account, his monthly income is 
actually $1,658. (Findings of Fact No. 9, page 151, Record) 
(3/4/98 Tr. at 80-83). 
8. During the marriage, Mrs. Bradford worked at 
temporary jobs. Because she has trouble focusing on her 
task and may have carpal tunnel syndrome, she is unable to 
work (Findings of Fact No. 10, page 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. 
4 
at 90-92) . 
9. Mrs. Bradford receives approximately $150 per month 
in child care for taking care of her granddaughter and $381 
in Social Security, which amounts to $531 in monthly income. 
(Findings of Fact No 11, p. 151, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 93). 
10. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bradford can be retained or 
develop new skills in order to substantially increase their 
income. (Findings of Fact No. 12, p. 151, Record). 
11. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have lived in Mr. Bradford's 
home in Spanish Fork, Utah, since the beginning of their 
marriage. This home was paid for and then given to Mr. 
Bradford as an inheritance gift before he married Mrs. 
Bradford. Mr. Bradford was born and raised in this house, 
and it has been passed from generation to generation within 
his family. (Findings of Fact No. 13, p. 151, Record) 
(3/4/98 Tr. At 34-35). 
12. Since the parties have been married, various 
improvements have been made to the home. This work includes 
a repaired roof and septic system, the addition of a new 
furnace, and plumbing work that connected the home to city 
water. Findings of Fact No. 14, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. 
at 18-23) . 
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13. Although Mrs. Bradford claims that she was an 
integral part of the home improvements, she actually made 
only phone calls and arrangements for the work to be done. 
(Findings of Fact No. 15, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 18-
23) . 
14. The repairs and improvements made to the home were 
paid for by funds which Mr. Bradford received from a 
settlement with Geneva Steel. This money was acquired 
before the marriage. (Findings of Fact No. 16, p. 150, 
Record) . (3/4/98 Tr. at 48) . 
15. Neither party disputes that the value of the home 
is $180,000. (Findings of Fact No. 17, p. 150, Record). 
16. Mr. Bradford deeded the home by way of warranty 
deed to he and Mrs. Bradford as "joint tenants with full 
rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common" 
approximately four years after they had married. (Findings 
of Fact No. 18, p.150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 44). 
17. Mr. Bradford filed for divorce from Mrs. Bradford 
in 1992. At that time, Mr. Bradford requested that both the 
home and other real property be awarded to him. The divorce 
action was dismissed in 1993. (Findings of Fact No. 19, p. 
150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55) . 
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18. Since 1992, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have had many 
arguments, and Mr. Bradford has threatened to divorce Mrs. 
Bradford on many occasions. (Findings of Fact No. 20, p. 
150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 55) . 
19. James DeMita, Mrs. Bradford's adult son, has been 
living with Mr. and Mrs. Bradford since 1995. Mr. Demitafs 
son also stays at the home from time to time. In exchange 
for these living arrangements, Mr. Demita neither pays rent 
nor the utility bill and resides in the home rent-free. 
(Findings of Fact No. 21, p. 150, Record). 
20. Mr. Demita attended one year of law school and has 
since worked at various jobs. At the time of the trial, Mr. 
Demita was employed on a part-time basis at a computer 
store. His 1996 gross income was approximately $3,500 
(Findings of Fact No. 22, p. 150, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 
106-08). 
21. In 1996, all three parties began work together to 
develop the land for re-zoning, division into lots and sale. 
They hired LSI, Inc. to survey the ground, prepare a 
subdivision plat and perform other pre-sales work. In 
exchange for his assistance with this project, Mr. Demita 
was to receive 25% of the profits from the sale. (Findings 
7 
of Fact No. 23, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 42-43; 61-
76) . 
22. In July 1996, Mr. Bradford discovered various 
engineers in his home when he entered his house. Although 
the reasons for the ensuing argument with Mrs. Bradford are 
in dispute, Mr. Bradford was upset with the project's 
development. This argument was more severe than the others, 
and divorce was again discussed. (Findings of Fact No. 24, 
p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 38-40) . 
23. On August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford deeded her share 
of the home by way of quit claim deed to her son James 
Demita. Mr. Demita gave his mother $10 for the transaction. 
(Findings of Fact No. 25, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 4-
10) . 
24. $10 is not the equivalent value of one-half of the 
house and property. (Findings of Fact No. 26, p. 149, 
Record). 
25. Because Mr. Demita is Mrs. Bradford's son, the 
quit-claim transfer of her property to his name was made to 
an "insider," according to Utah Law. (Findings of Fact No. 
27, p. 149, Record). 
26. Although she deeded her portion of the property to 
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Mr. Demita rather than any of her other children, Mrs. 
Bradford claimed that the transfer was made for estate 
planning purposes. At trial, however, she acknowledged that 
she did not prepare a will nor did she prepare any 
instructions whatsoever regarding the disposition of the 
property. (Findings of Fact No. 28, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 
Tr. at 10-14). 
27. After this transfer, Mrs. Bradford and Mr. Demita 
continued to live in the home as they had before. (Findings 
of Fact No. 29, p. 149, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 12-14). 
28. Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita ever told Mr. 
Bradford about the quit-claim transfer. Mr. Bradford 
discovered the existence of the deed when his daughter went 
to the recorder's office to verify that the home and 
property has been re-zoned for development as Mr. Demita had 
mentioned. At this time, the daughter discovered the Quit-
Claim Deed and that the property had actually never been re-
zoned. (Findings of Fact No. 30, p. 148-49, Record) (3/4/98 
Tr. at 14, 42, 45). 
29. After discovering this information, Mr. Bradford 
commenced another divorce action against his wife. The time 
between the granting of the deed and the filing of divorce 
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was approximately 11 months. (Findings of Fact No. 31, p. 
148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 46). 
30. The transfer of Mrs. Bradford's portion of the home 
to her son left her in possession of only her personal 
property, which has limited value. Thus, this transfer 
constituted substantially all of her assets. (Findings of 
Fact No. 32, p. 148, Record). 
31. When asked on cross-examination whether she could 
afford to pay Mr. Bradford for one-half of the property's 
value, Mrs. Bradford indicated that she would not be able to 
do so, but that she would have to rely on family members if 
she were obligated to pay such a sum. (Findings of Fact No. 
33, p. 148, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 101-02). 
32. At the time of the transfer of the Quit-Claim Deed, 
Mrs. Bradford should have reasonably believed that Mr. 
Bradford might seek to divorce her, and that he would 
probably claim the home and property as his own as he had 
done so in the previous 1992 divorce action. (Findings of 
Fact No. 34, p. 148, Record). 
33. The house and property are not partitionable, as 
they contain a residence, road, and river frontage. If an 
interest were conveyed, the house would have to be 
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refinanced or sold. (Findings of Fact No. 35, p. 148, 
Record). 
34. Even though Mr. Bradford placed Mrs. Bradford's 
name on the deed to the house in 1992, the trial court found 
that the house and property belong to Mr. Bradford since he 
inherited this from his father before he married Mrs. 
Bradford. This finding is consistent with previous Utah 
Supreme Court decisions wherein the parties married later in 
life, and one of the parties had brought into the marriage 
an inheritance gift which was subsequently deeded to the 
other party. See Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44 (Utah 
1981); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980). 
(Findings of Fact No. 36, p. 148, Record). 
35. Mr. Bradford earns $1,926 per month, but his net 
income is approximately $1,658. His monthly expenses are 
$1,000 per month without rent or a mortgage payment. These 
expenses are reasonable and necessary. (Findings of Fact 
No. 37, p. 147-48, Record). 
36.. Mr. Bradford has approximately $600 per month 
after necessary expenses. Mr. Bradford also has at his 
disposal the house and property which do not have a mortgage 
and are worth approximately $180,000. (Findings of Fact No. 
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38, p. 147, Record) (3/4/98 Tr. at 80-83). 
37. Mrs. Bradford nets $531 per month. She listed her 
expenses at $1750 which includes $600 for rent (which she is 
currently not paying). This leaves Mrs. Bradford with a 
shortfall of approximately 1,200 per month. However, she is 
65 years old, not trained in an employable skill, and has 
health concerns. She receives $150 per month for caring for 
one of her grandchildren. Although she may be able to earn 
more from child care, there is insufficient evidence that 
she would be able to find such a position, or that even if 
she were to increase her child care hours that it would meet 
her shortfall. Mrs. Bradford has a need for alimony. 
(Findings of Fact No. 39, p. 147, Record). 
38. Mrs. Bradford has expenses which exceed her income, 
but she cannot make up for this shortfall. Mr. Bradford has 
approximately $600 per month after expenses. Therefore, Mr. 
Bradford is required to pay Mrs. Bradford $600 per month in 
alimony for a term not to exceed the length of the marriage. 
This gives $1,131.00 to Mrs. Bradford to meet her expenses 
and leaves 1,058.00 for Mr. Bradford's expenses. (Findings 
of Fact No. 40, p. 147, Record). 
39. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford acquired the following 
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investments during their marriage: 
First Security Bank Accounts $6,492 
Valic IRA $2,418 
Utah Retirement $1,583 
Insurance Policy Cash Value $3,990 
(Findings of Fact No. 41, p. 147, Record). 
40. Each party is awarded one-half of the total sum 
from the above investments. The remainder of the personal 
property has been divided between the parties and the same 
should be awarded as divided. (Findings of Fact No. 42, p. 
146, Record). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this response brief, Mr. Bradford will rebut each of 
Mrs. Bradford's arguments. Her arguments can be summarized 
as follows: 1) Mrs. Bradford did not fraudulently convey 
the home in question; 2) Mr. Bradford was not her 
"creditor;" 3) The portion of the home that she allegedly 
owned was "gifted" to her by her former husband; and 4) The 
lower court abused its broad powers of discretion when it 
apportioned the property in its divorce decree. 
In rebuttal, Mr. Bradford will show that his ex-wife 
fraudulently conveyed her portion of the marital home to her 
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son in violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. To 
this end, Mr. Bradford will show that he was a 
"creditor" of Mrs. Bradford. 
Mr. Bradford will also show that the home was not a 
legal gift, as Mrs. Bradford claims. Lastly, Mr. Bradford 
will explain why the lower court did not abuse its broad 
powers of discretion when it decided to apportion the 
marital property. To this end, Mr. Bradford will ask this 
Court to affirm the lower court's decision on all counts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
A. Mrs. Bradford Violated the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act. 
The first issue to be resolved is whether Mrs. Bradford 
violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 
sec. 25-6-5 (1988) (hereinafter "the Act") (See Attached 
Addendum) .x 
Many jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, recognizing that "[t]he law has long held that 
transfers of property designed to place a debtor's assets 
beyond the reach of the debtor's creditors are void as to 
the creditors." Indeed, the Act has a rich history in the 
common law. See, e.g., 13 Elizabeth 1 (1570) Ch. Twyne's 
Case, 3 Coke 80, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (1601); Clements v. Moore, 
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 299, 312, 18 L.Ed. 786 (1867); Smith v. 
Holland, 298 Ky. 598, 603-604, 183 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. Ct. 
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Mrs. Bradford's conduct falls squarely within the 
language of the Act. Mr. Bradford was a creditor with a 
claim before the conveyance, and Mrs. Bradford, acting with 
actual intent, sought to hinder, delay, or defraud him.2 
Specifically, Mrs. Bradford's conduct aligns itself with at 
least 7 of the 11 indicators of "actual intent" as found in 
25-6-5(2): 
subsection "a" - The conveyance was made to an insider.3 
subsection yyb" - Both Mrs. Bradford and her adult son, James 
Demita, along with Mr. Bradford, possessed and were in 
control of the home after the transfer. Indeed, Mrs. 
Bradford and Mr. Demita continued to live in the home. 
subsection "c" - Neither Mrs. Bradford nor Mr. Demita 
informed Mr. Bradford about the transfer. 
subsection M " - The transfer was made only a month before 
she was sued for an action in divorce. 
subsection "e" - The transfer, valued at approximately 
$90,000, consisted of virtually all of Mrs. Bradford's 
assets (her assets were found by the trial court to amount 
to about $5, 000) . 
App. 1944); Ranier National Bank v. McCracken, 26 Wash Appl. 
498, 505-506, 615 P.2d 469, 474 (1980). 
2
 For a more detailed discussion regarding Mr. 
Bradford's status as Mrs. Bradford's creditor, see Infra p. 
16. 
3
 The Act states that an insider can include "a 
relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the 
debtor. . ." Id., sec. 25-6-2(7)(a)(i). 
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subsection "1" - Mrs. Bradford became insolvent after she 
transferred the home. 
subsection "j" - Mrs. Bradford transferred the home shortly 
before the action in divorce was to leave her in debt. 
B. Mr. Bradford was Mrs. Bradford's Creditor within 
the Language of the Act. 
The crux of Mrs. Bradford's argument regarding 
fraudulent conveyances, hinges upon her belief that Mr. 
Bradford was not her creditor. 
First, it should be noted that the plain language of the 
Act proves otherwise. A creditor is "a person who has a 
claim," and a "[c]laim means a right to payment, whether or 
not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured." Id., at 25-6-2 (3)- (4) (emphasis added). At the 
time of the conveyance, and in the years before, Mr. 
Bradford had threatened Mrs. Bradford with a suit in divorce 
many times. In July 1996, the parties had a particularly 
severe argument, and the topic was again discussed. Only 
one month later, on August 8, 1996, Mrs. Bradford conveyed 
the property in question.4 
4
 Even if Mrs. Bradford acted without actual intent, 
her actions also comport with the "alternative language" of 
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Second, it should be noted that many courts have 
recognized a spouse as a "creditor" for purposes of a 
fraudulent conveyance action. Although Mr. Bradford has 
found no Utah cases directly on point, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon (citing an earlier decision) resolved this exact 
issue in Adamson v. Adamson, 541 P.2d 460 (Or. 1975). 
In Weber v. Rothchild, 15 Or. 385, 388-89, 15 
P. 650, 2 Am.St.Rep. 162 (1887), we held that 
a person in the position of plaintiff may 
maintain a suit to set aside a transaction 
which may defeat her recovery and rights in a 
contemplated suit for divorce. See also Bosma 
v. Harder, 94 Or. 219, 230-32, 185 P. 741 
(1919); Burnett et al. V. Hatch, 200 Or. 291, 
266 P.2d 414 (1954). This rule prevails in 
other jurisdictions that have considered the 
matter. See Bigelow, The Law of Fraudulent 
Conveyances 168, 173 (1911); Note. 14 Albany 
L. Rev. 102, 103-04 (1950); Annot., 49 
A.L.R.2d 521 sec. 10 at 556-58 (1956); 37 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances sec. 133 
(1968). 
We conclude, as did the trial court, that 
the conveyance by deed of April 14, 1972, was 
obtained by fraud to hinder or prevent 
plaintiff's recovery of Brian's equitable 
interest in the fourplex, in the divorce suit, 
and is therefore set aside and held to be 
void. 
Adamson at 4 66. 
the Act — sec. 25-6-5(1) (b) (i-ii) . Specifically, the co-
appellant, James Demita, paid Mrs. Bradford $10 for half of 
a home valued at approximately $180,000 (section (1)(b). 
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In short, Mr. Bradford was clearly a "creditor" within 
the meaning of the Act, and this conclusion is supported by 
ample case authority. 
II. DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
The bulk of Mrs. Bradford's argument concerns the issue 
of a fraudulent conveyance; however, Mrs. Bradford makes two 
equity arguments, which will now be discussed together. 
A. Reverter of Home 
Mrs. Bradford asserts that the trial court erroneously 
reverted the home to Mr. Bradford as well as inequitably 
distributed the marital property. The overriding rule that 
affects both issues is thus: "In divorce proceedings, the 
trial court has considerable discretion concerning property 
distribution. This court will not disturb the trial court's 
decision unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion[;]" Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 
1986)) and the trial court's ". . . actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity." Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 
Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992)). 
As to the distribution of pre-marital property, the Utah 
18 
Court of Appeals has stated that M[a]s a general rule, 
however, premarital property is viewed as separate property, 
and equity usually requires that *each party retain the 
separate property he or she brought into the marriage.'" 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah App. 1991), cert 
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) ((quoting Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 Utah App. 1990)). 
Continuing with the concept that a trial court is 
afforded latitude when dividing marital property, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
Although the home was held in joint tenancy, 
that is not conclusive that a gift has been 
made. . . The trial court found as follows: 
Although the mobile home in issue is [was] 
held in joint tenancy, there was no intention 
by Plaintiff to create a one-half property 
interest in Defendant, nor any expectation by 
Defendant that he had received a one-half 
property interest. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) .5 In 
Jesperson, the parties were married for approximately six 
years; they were both older individuals (the husband was 73, 
5
 Mrs. Bradford also asserts that Mr. Bradford gave 
her portion of the home to her as a gift. The findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, however, prove otherwise. The 
trial judge took into consideration Mr. Eiradford' s request 
for reverter of Mrs. Bradford's interest when he filed for 
divorce against her in 1992. 
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and the wife was 68); no children were born of the marriage; 
and, lastly, although the home had been owned by the wife 
before their marriage, and although she had deeded a joint 
tenancy interest to her husband during their marriage, the 
Court reverted the property to her.6 
Jesperson is very similar to the case at bar, in that 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were married later in life, and they 
had no children during their rather short marriage. Also, 
Mr. Bradford was born and raised in the home, which had been 
passed down in his family for many generations. See also 
Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1270 (Utah App. 1994) (affirming 
a divorce decree between a husband and his second wife, 
wherein the marital home was reverted to the husband who had 
raised his nine children in it from a previous marriage but 
had Quit Claimed half of the property to the wife a few days 
before they were married.). 
B. Apportionment of the Marital Property, Generally 
As to the argument that the marital property was 
6
 See also Georgedes v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 
(Utah 1981) (trial court, after entering decree of divorce 
for parties seeking to dissolve their second but short 
marriage, did not abuse its powers of discretion when it 
reverted pre-marital property to its original owners.). 
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inequitably divided, the overarching rule from Walters still 
applies: "[tjhis court will not disturb the trial court's 
decision [concerning property division] unless it is clearly 
unjust or a clear abuse of discretion." Walters v. Walters, 
812 P.2d at 66; accord Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 
(Utah App. 1988).7 
When dividing the marital property, the trial court 
should consider: 
the amount and kind of property to be divided, 
the source of the property, the parties' 
health, the parties standard of living and 
respective financial conditions, their needs 
and earning capacities, the duration of the 
marriage, what the parties gave up by the 
marriage, and the relationship the property 
division has with the amount of alimony 
awarded. 
Id., at 1147-48. 
When applying these rules to the case at bar, it should 
7
 See also Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah 
App. 1988),which states: 
there is no fixed formula upon which to 
determine a division of properties in a 
divorce action[;] the trial court has 
considerable latitude in adjusting financial 
and property interests, and its actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Id. at 1146. 
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first be mentioned that if the court's decision regarding 
the home is reversed, it will either need to be refinanced 
or sold — all costly procedures. As mentioned above, the 
home was inherited by Mr, Bradford and has been in his 
family for generations. Also, the marriage was rather 
short, neither party is in a state of health which renders 
them unable to earn an income, and the assets used to 
improve the home during the marriage came out of Mr. 
Bradford's pocket. To this end, this Court should find that 
the lower court did not abuse its broad powers of discretion 
when it reverted the home to Mr. Bradford and apportioned 
the marital property as it saw fit. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, Mr. Bradford submits that his points are 
well taken and requests this Court to affirm the lower 
court's decision in respect to all issues. 
DATED this £ ^ day of May, 1999. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS R. PATTON 
Attorney for Appellee George Bradford 
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6
- .L Short title. 
T"is chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
*
n
 this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other 
than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discre-
tionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstand-
ing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or 
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or 
holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, other than a 
person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power 
to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has 
not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the 
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person 
substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the 
debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business 
under a lease or other agreement or controls substan-
t i a ^ #// of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not 
kiclude: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a 
valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt 
under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the 
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by 
a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not 
the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-
dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
Undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor"' means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general 
partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(a)(ii); 
(iv> a corporation of which the debtor is a 
directory officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, 
officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
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(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general 
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is 
a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(c)(iii); 
(v) a limited liability company of which the 
debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which 
the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a 
general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership de-
scribed in Subsection (7)(dXiii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, 
manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the 
affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in 
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an 
obligation, and includes a security interest created by 
agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable 
process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory 
lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited 
liability company, corporation, association, organization, 
government or governmental subdivision or agency, busi-
ness trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the sub-
ject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual 
related to a spouse, related by consanguinity within the 
third degree as determined by the common law, or a 
spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive rela-
tionship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, 
absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of 
disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an 
asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and 
creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against 
the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal 
or equitable process or proceedings. 1992 
25-6-3. Inso lvency. 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is 
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
($S A debtor who is ^ewerally ivot payiag his debts a s tivey 
become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the 
sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, 
at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the 
sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's 
nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership 
debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that 
has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred 
in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to 
the extent it is secured by a valid Hen on property of the debtor 
not included as an asset. 1988 
25-6*4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred 
or a# antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value 
does not include an unperformed promise made other than in 
the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish 
support to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(lXb) and Section 25-6-6, a 
person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person 
acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a 
regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution 
of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the 
interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of 
trust* or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange 
between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to 
be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contempora-
neous. 1988 
25-6'5- Fraudulent transfer — Claim aris ing before or 
after transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose 
before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the 
obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor; or 
<&\ vdth&vkt recelvisug ^ reasonably ^\uHalen&. vaba& v& 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a busi-
ness or a transaction for which the remaining assets 
of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to 
the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably 
should have believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
(2) lb determine "actual intent" under Subsection (lXa), 
consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or con-
cealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was 
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with 
guit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's 
assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the 
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after 
a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor. 1988 
25-6'6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before 
transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the 
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obli-
gation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
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(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the 
transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the 
debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had reason-
able cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 1989 
25-6-7, Transfer — When made. 
In this chapter: 
( 1 ) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property 
other than a fixture, but including the interest of a 
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the 
asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a 
good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor 
against whom applicable law permits the transfer to 
be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset 
tha t is superior to the interest of the transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real prop-
erty or tha t is a fixture, when the transfer is so far 
perfected tha t a creditor on a simple contract cannot 
acquire a judicial lien other than under this chapter 
tha t is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be per-
fected as provided in Subsection (1) and the transfer is not 
so perfected before the commencement of an action for 
relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made 
immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be 
perfected as provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is 
made when it becomes effective between the debtor and 
the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired 
rights in the asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the 
parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing 
executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the 
benefit of the obligee. 1988 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors . 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation 
under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in 
Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against 
the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in 
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in 
accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the 
debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset t rans-
ferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the 
asset transferred or of other property of the t rans-
feree; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may re-
quire. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against 
the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution 
on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 1988 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-5(l)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a 
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent t rans-
feree or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the 
extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under 
Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor may recover judgment for 
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsec-
tion (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered 
against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for 
whose benefit the transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith 
transferee who took for value or from any subsequent 
transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the 
value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an 
amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the 
transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obliga-
tion under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is 
entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the 
transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a Uen on or a right to retain any interest in the asset 
transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the 
judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) 
or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor 
when the termination is pursuant to the lease and appli-
cable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance 
with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the 
benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless 
the new value was secured by a valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or finan-
cial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabili-
ta te the debtor and the transfer secured present value 
given for tha t purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the 
deb to r . 1988 
25-6-10. Claim for re l ie f — Time l imits . 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent 
transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished 
unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years 
after the transfer was made or the obligation was in-
curred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or 
obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered 
by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within 
four years after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred; or 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. 
1988 
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced b)' this chapter, the principles of law and 
equity, including merchant law and the law relating to prin-
cipal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, 
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insol-
vency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement 
this chapter's provisions. 1988 
25-6-12. Construct ion of c h a p t e r . 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject of this chapter among states enacting it. 19S8 
